

VZCZCXRO2561

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FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6885
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2170
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1540
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002065

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2019

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [OSCE](#) [KZ](#)

SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: NAZARBAYEV TO PERSONALLY LOBBY FOR SUMMIT

REF: (A) ASTANA 2008

(B) USOSCE 0254

(C) ASTANA 2053

Classified By: Charge d' affaires, a. i., Pamela Spratlen: 1.4 (b),
(d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 18, deputy head of the Astana OSCE Center further briefed the CDA on the November 12 visit to Astana of the Secretary General of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Marc Perrin de Brichambaut. President Nazarbayev is prepared to personally lobby the leaders of OSCE participating states to garner their support for an OSCE summit in ¶2010. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively sought de Brichambaut's advice on how to include mention of a 2010 summit into the upcoming Athens Ministerial's final document. De Brichambaut stressed the need for substance and highlighted the work required for a summit. However, he underlined the OSCE Secretariat's responsibility to implement the goals set by participating states and the Chairman. Kloetzer said de Brichambaut "was not extremely happy" with his meeting with the President, but generally pleased by his interaction with the MFA. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) On November 18, deputy head of the Astana OSCE Center Jeannette Kloetzer outlined in more detail for the CDA the November 12 working visit to Astana by Secretary General of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Marc Perrin de Brichambaut (refs A and B). Kloetzer said that Kazakhstan's desire to host an OSCE summit in 2010 dominated de Brichambaut's discussions and was the sole topic of conversation with President Nazarbayev. Nazarbayev declared his readiness to personally lobby the leaders of participating states to obtain the needed consensus, she said. Kloetzer believes that Nazarbayev will pitch ideas that are of interest to everybody in order to achieve broad support -- Afghanistan to entice the United States, European security architecture to interest the Russians, and reaffirmation of commitment to the Helsinki principles to bring along all OSCE members. The MFA also floated protracted conflicts, the effect of the financial crisis on migration, and cooperation with other regional organizations as possible topics. According to Kloetzer, de Brichambaut stressed to President Nazarbayev, Foreign Minister-State Secretary Saudabayev, and Deputy Foreign Minister Zhigalov that "substance was important." He encouraged the Kazakhtanis to focus on the Corfu process and broader discussions of European security, but stressed that a summit must cover all three OSCE dimensions equally.

13. (C) The Kazakhstanis are determined to have the final declaration of the Athens Ministerial in December mention the summit, said Kloetzer, and Saudabayev actively sought de Brichambaut's advice on how to accomplish this goal. When De Brichambaut tried to prepare Saudabayev for the possibility that the final declaration will not mention the summit, Saudabayev became "visibly upset" and asserted, "We do not see, think, or envisage that possibility. It has to work." "It is clear he has explicit orders from the top," said Kloetzer. The Kazakhstanis maintain that France, Spain, Italy, the Holy See, Serbia, Finland, Lithuania, Turkey, Romania, and the CIS countries support the idea of the summit. (NOTE: Representatives from the Embassies of Italy, Spain, the UK, and the Netherlands told Pol/Econ Chief on November 16 that their governments will insist on substance before they commit to a summit (ref C). END NOTE.)

14. (C) Kloetzer said both Saudabayev and Zhigalov actively sought de Brichambaut's advice on how to garner the necessary support for the summit and what topics to introduce. De Brichambaut stressed that the Secretariat "serves the wishes of the participating states," and it is the participating states that make the ultimate decision on the timing and topics of the summit. He underlined that a summit needs a great deal of preparation, but noted that his job as Secretary General is to assist the Chairman in fulfilling whatever goals are set. Zhigalov asked de Brichambaut about the possibility of canceling the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) during a summit year. De Brichambaut politely and firmly advised against doing so.

15. (C) Asked for de Brichambaut's overall impressions of the visit, Kloetzer said "he was not extremely happy." De Brichambaut previously met Nazarbayev several times, the first time immediately following the 2007 Madrid Ministerial. At that time, Nazarbayev and

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de Brichambaut had a "very constructive discussion as partners," said Kloetzer. "This time, Nazarbayev acted like the big boss. The Kazakhstanis are so confident now. They feel like they are in the driver's seat." Kloetzer said that working-level MFA officials, like Zhigalov and OSCE Task Force Coordinator Abdykarimov, are fully aware of the amount of work the chairmanship year will bring. However, the higher-ups, like Nazarbayev and Saudabayev, may not understand the efforts required for a summit. Kloetzer believes the Kazakhstanis will not agree to a high-level meeting instead of a summit unless the summit idea becomes a complete non-starter.

16. (C) Kloetzer said the Secretary General generally was happy with his interaction with the MFA. She noted that Saudabayev was "still a bit uninformed on OSCE issues," but hastened to add that he performed better than when he met the group of visiting OSCE Permanent Representatives October 21-23. His apparent unpreparedness at that time made the Russian Permanent Representative wonder out loud "why his minions did not prepare a cheat sheet for him."

17. (C) COMMENT: It is clear from Kloetzer's comments that de Brichambaut attempted to walk a careful line between the mood among the delegations in Vienna and the strong wishes of the incoming Chairman, Kazakhstan. It is hard to say whether the President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs heard his message that substance must come before participating states will commit to a summit. On this topic, we believe the government of Kazakhstan prefers to see all responses in the best possible light. END COMMENT.

SPRATLEN